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Air transportation is a cyclical industry 
characterized by periods of strong growth 
followed by periods of deep capacity reductions 
and other desperate measures by airlines to 
remain operational (Skinner et al., 1999; 
Stonier, 1999). Planning in the face of this 
volatility becomes a major problem for many 
stakeholders, in particular airports and aircraft 
manufacturers. Because of the large capital 
requirements and long lead times generally 
associated with new runways, passenger 
buildings, or aircraft assembly lines, the timing 
of these investments is of particular importance. 
A premature investment may result in unused 
capacity that sits idle without generating any 
returns whereas a tardy investment may miss 
the potential market completely. 
A flexible approach for infrastructure 
delivery is a means of managing the risk 
associated with these types of endeavors. The 
central idea is to structure the project so that 
it would benefi t from the upside potential if 
circumstances are resolved favorably, but would 
be protected from downside losses otherwise. 
Traditional evaluation techniques, such as the 
net present value (NPV) rule or decision analysis 
(DA), may not always be appropriate to determine 
the value of such strategies. In this paper, a new 
methodology to determine the strategic value 
of air transportation infrastructure based on 
Monte Carlo simulation and system dynamics 
in a real options framework is presented. This 
methodology is illustrated by considering a 
simple, yet common, situation where a service 
facility (e.g., a runway, a passenger building, 
etc.) has fi xed capacity and stochastic demand.
The objective of this research is to develop a 
methodology to support investment decisions in 
air transportation infrastructure by determining 
the value of flexible capacity-expansion 
strategies. Two main hypothesis underlie this 
work: fi rst, that the value of flexibility arises 
from the coupling of internal (project) dynamics 
to external (market) dynamics. This suggests 
using systems dynamics as a modeling tool. 
Second, that the value of flexibility also arises 
from uncertainties related to the technology 
and market conditions. This merits the use of 
Monte Carlo simulation to take multiple sources 
of uncertainty into account.
In the second section, some difficulties 
with traditional valuation methodologies are 
highlighted. In the third and fourth sections, 
a brief overview of fi nancial and real options, 
respectively, is given. In the fi fth section, the 
evaluation of real options with uncertain exer-
cise price is introduced. In the sixth section, the 
methodology proposed here is explained. In the 
seventh section, an airport capacity expansion 
project is used as an example to demonstrate this 
methodology. In the eighth section, numerical 
results are presented. In the ninth and fi nal sec-
tion, conclusions are presented.
INVESTMENTS UNDER UNCERTAINTY IN 
AIR TRANSPORTATION: A REAL OPTIONS 
PERSPECTIVE
Infrastructure investment decisions in air transportation are diffi cult because of long lead times, large 
capital expenditures and the technological, market and political uncertainties inherent in aviation. 
In such an environment, a flexible investment strategy is a means of managing risk. The central idea 
is to structure the investment so that it would benefi t from the upside potential if circumstances are 
resolved favorably, but would be protected from downside losses otherwise. In this paper, an evalua-
tion methodology based on system dynamics and Monte Carlo simulation in a real options framework 
is utilized to evaluate different flexible infrastructure delivery strategies. 
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DIFFICULTIES WITH TRADITIONAL 
VALUATION METHODOLOGIES
Traditional evaluation methodologies such as 
the net present value rule and decision analysis 
may not always be appropriate for determining 
the value of flexibility in the face of uncertainty. 
In the NPV rule, the investment decision must 
be made with information available today 
(Copeland and Antikarov, 2001). Therefore, 
there is no explicit consideration of the effects 
of managerial flexibility on the outcome of the 
investment. For example, at the point of project 
evaluation, cash flows are assumed to occur at 
fi xed points in time. Thus, while uncertainties 
related to the magnitude of the cash flows can 
be determined with different methods, e.g., 
Monte Carlo simulation, there is no possibility 
to incorporate changes in the schedule of cash 
flows that might result from managerial actions. 
Decision analysis is an improvement over the 
NPV rule in terms of being able to explicitly 
incorporate the effect of flexibility into the 
decision framework, because, by using decision 
trees, it is possible to assign probabilities to 
different outcomes at certain points in time 
(Amram and Kulatilaka, 1999). Thus, DA can 
be used to fi nd the value of flexibility in many 
situations. However, if there are many sources 
of uncertainty, which is the case in many large 
infrastructure investments, the number of 
paths in the tree expands geometrically with 
the number of decisions and states considered 
for each variable (Trigeorgis, 1996). In such a 
case, the evaluation of the project with DA may 
become onerous.
In the past decade, real options analysis 
(ROA) has emerged as an alternative project 
valuation technique. It is based on fi nancial 
options theory but, instead of fi nding the value 
of holding an option on a fi nancial asset, it is 
applied to “real” projects to estimate the value 
of flexibility in the face of uncertainty (Dixit 
and Pindyck, 1994). ROA is related to the NPV 
rule and decision analysis to the extent that they 
all use discounted cash flow (DCF) to different 
degrees in the evaluation of future cash flows. 
However, ROA can offer advantages over the 
NPV rule and DA by explicitly accounting for 
flexibility and multiple sources of uncertainty in 
a compact manner. 
In the next section, the fundamental con-
cepts of fi nancial options are explained. This 
discussion is useful to understand the basics of 
real options presented afterwards. 
BASICS OF FINANCIAL OPTIONS
Financial options are securities that give the 
option owner the right, but not the obligation, 
to buy or sell an asset at a pre-determined price 
within a specifi ed period of time (Black and 
Scholes, 1973). The price paid for the asset when 
the option is exercised is called the “exercise 
price” or “strike price.” The last day on which the 
option may be exercised is called the “expiration 
date” or “maturity date.” A “European option” 
can only be exercised on the expiration date; an 
“American option” can be exercised at any time 
up to the maturity date.
If an investor owns an option, the owner 
is able to defer the decision to fully invest until 
more information is available about the state of 
the world. Thus, the investor can protect against 
downside losses by only investing when condi-
tions are favorable.
The payoff of a European call option, w, on 
a non-dividend paying stock is shown in Figure 
1.1 If the stock price, S, is less than the strike 
price, X, the option does not get exercised and 
the payoff is zero. However, if S is larger than 
X, the option holder has the option of buying the 
stock for X and then selling it for S, thus making 
a profi t of S-X. Mathematically, the payoff of a 
call option can be expressed as the maximum of 
S-X or zero, i.e., max[S-X, 0]. This profi t must 
be compared to the cost of obtaining the option 
to determine the net profi t.
Options are valuable because the future 
stock price is uncertain (see Figure 2). In fact, 
the value of an option increases with the vola-
tility of the stock, because this means that the 
stock can reach higher prices (it can also reach 
lower prices, but this is not of concern because 
the option protects the investor from downside 
movements). 
BASICS OF REAL OPTIONS
Real options analysis (ROA) uses some of the 
basics of fi nancial options theory to fi nd the 
value of options in “real” projects. For example, 
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Figure 1: Payoff of a European Call Option on a Non-Dividend Paying Stock, S
Source: Authors with information from Brealey and Myers (1996)
Figure 2: The Stochastic Nature of Stock Prices Make Options Valuable
Source: Authors with information from Brealey and Myers (1996)
consider a city that is contemplating building a 
new airport. Assume further that current levels 
of demand require only one runway, but there 
are indications that future demand may grow to 
levels where a second runway could be neces-
sary. A prudent strategy in this case would be to 
build the fi rst runway and acquire the land for 
the second runway now, then wait until traffi c 
levels increased signifi cantly before building the 
second runway.
Ownership of the land for the second run-
way gives the airport developers the right, but 
not the obligation, of expanding capacity if and 
when it is needed. In this manner, the additional 
capacity of the second runway can be realized 
more quickly than in a case where one runway 
was built but no land was purchased, thus in-
creasing the likelihood that the second runway 
would be better timed with the market. Another 
approach would be to build both runways now. 
However, given uncertainties in demand, there is 
a risk that the second runway may not be needed. 
The option to build the second runway offers 
protection against this situation. 
Creating and having the option comes at a 
price: the airport developer must buy a piece 
of land. This is where ROA can be particularly 
useful because it can help to determine the value 
of this option and, hence, indicate the maximum 
price that an investor should be willing to pay 
for it. 
EVALUATING REAL OPTIONS WITH 
VARYING STOCK PRICE AND STRIKE 
PRICE
Most traditional fi nancial option methodolo-
gies assume that the strike price is fi xed a priori 
and does not change throughout the life of the 
option. While this may be a valid assumption 
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for fi nancial options, it is not necessarily true 
for real projects because the strike price of real 
options (generally taken to be a cost related to 
the project, such as capital investments and/or 
operational or maintenance expenditures) can 
certainly vary over time. 
There are a few examples in the fi nancial 
options literature that address the valuation of 
options when the strike price is uncertain. Stanley 
Fischer (1978) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994) 
assume that the strike price can be represented 
by a geometric Brownian motion (GBM) and use 
this behavior to derive their analytical evaluation 
formulae. While GBMs may be appropriate to 
model the behavior of stock and strike prices for 
fi nancial options, expected revenues and costs of 
real projects do not necessarily follow these type 
of stochastic processes. 
An approach from the ROA literature 
that can be used to evaluate real options with 
uncertain exercise prices is given by Robert 
Tufano and Alberto Moel (1997) (referred to 
as the “Tufano-Moel approach” here). Their 
technique consists of simulating the value of the 
underlying asset until the end of the life of the 
project, assuming that the real option is always 
exercised, and then fi nding its present value. This 
process is repeated thousands of times using 
Monte Carlo simulation to incorporate multiple 
sources of uncertainty both on revenues as well 
as on costs. In this manner, a distribution of net 
present values for the project with its associated 
mean is obtained (Figure 3, left). 
The power of real options is that they allow 
managers to abandon projects with negative 
outcomes. Tufano and Moel (1997) argue that 
this can be represented by substituting negative 
NPVs with zero which essentially truncates the 
distribution (Figure 3, right). Further, they argue 
that the mean of this truncated distribution is the 
value of the project with flexibility, and that the 
value of the real option is the difference between 
the means with and without flexibility.
REAL OPTIONS, SYSTEM DYNAMICS 
AND MONTE CARLO SIMULATION
The methodology proposed by Tufano and Moel 
can be used to fi nd the value of real options when 
the exercise price is uncertain by simulating the 
expected net present values. Here, an alternative 
approach is proposed that combines the power 
of simulation with the simplicity of analytical 
solutions. As in the case of Tufano and Moel, 
the methodology developed here assumes a 
European call-like real option. 
First, assume that the probability density 
function, f
s
(s), of the expected revenues from a 
real project (i.e., the stock price, S) at expiration 
time T is known. In addition, assume that the cost 
of exercising a real option on this project (i.e., 
the strike price, X) at expiration time T is also 
known (Figure 4).
In this case, the decision-maker would only 
exercise in those instances when the stock price 
(expected revenues) is greater than the strike 
price (exercise costs). The value of this option, w, 
can be calculated as the difference of two terms. 
The fi rst term is the expected value of revenues 
given that the revenues are realized, i.e., given 
that the option is exercised (Hull, 2000). Since 
the option would only be exercised if the stock 
Source: Authors with information from Tufano and Moel (1997)
Figure 3: Sketch of the Approach Proposed by Tufano and Moel to Evaluate Real Options
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price is higher than the strike price, this expected 
value can be represented as the expected value 
of S for values of s > X (see fi rst term in Equa-
tion 1). The second term represents the costs 
associated with exercising the option. It can be 
computed as the strike price, X, weighted by the 
probability that it is realized, i.e., the likelihood 
that the option is exercised (Chriss, 1997). This 
can be expressed as X times the probability that 
X will be incurred, i.e., the probability that s > 
X (second term in Equation 1):
(1)
In reality, however, exercise costs can also be 
uncertain. Therefore, assume that the expected 




Consequently, the value of the option, w, 
is now a random variable dependent on x (see 
Equation 2):
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The expected value of w can be determined by 
applying the defi nition of expected value for 














Figure 4: Probability Distribution of Expected Revenues, S, and
Fixed Construction Costs, X, at Time T
Figure 5: Probability Distribution of Expected Revenues, S, and


























If all values of s are larger than all values of x, the 
real option will be exercised with great certainty 
and its value is given by the above result. This 
is analogous to the value of fi nancial European 
call options when S is much larger than X, in 
which case the value of the fi nancial option 
approaches S - X. 
To fi nd the distributions of revenues and 
costs of the real project to be used in Equation 
3, a combination of system dynamics and Monte 
Carlo simulation is suggested. System dynamics 
is a powerful tool to model the internal dynamics, 
feedback loops and uncertainties of the project 
and its behavior given external influences. In 
addition, system dynamics is flexible enough 
to allow the simulation of other factors such as 
competitor behavior, if desired. Monte Carlo 
simulation can be combined with the system 
dynamics model to obtain a better representa-
tion of the cash flows by including the effects 
of different sources of uncertainty.
An advantage of this methodology over 
other analytical approaches, such as the ones 
proposed by Fischer (1978) and Dixit and Pin-
dyck (1994), is that the stock and strike price 
are not restricted to behaving like geometric 
Brownian motions. These distributions can be 
of any type and, therefore, can provide a better 
representation of project value. With respect to 
the Tufano-Moel approach, the methodology 
developed here would have the advantage of 
not being restricted to simulating the behavior 
of the stock and strike prices. If the distribution 
of costs and revenues can be expressed analyti-
cally, the methodology developed here can fi nd 
a closed-form solution for the value of the real 
option. This would not be possible using the Tu-
fano-Moel method. Another potential advantage 
is the possibility of managing cost for a given 
demand. For example, if demand is well under-
stood, the formula developed here could be used 
to fi nd the cost profi le that would maximize the 
value of the project. The Moel-Tufano approach 
would not be able to do this, either. Nevertheless, 
if the distributions of stock and strike prices must 
be obtained with simulation, the methodology 
developed here and the Moel-Tufano approach 
would be equally capable of fi nding the value 
of the real option.
As stated, this methodology assumes that 
costs and revenues are independent. This can be a 
reasonable assumption for those systems where, 
for example, the couplings between the costs of 
supplying and maintaining the infrastructure and 
demand are not very strong. In the case where 
these couplings may be signifi cant, conditional 
probabilities would have to be used.
Another important question regarding this 
evaluation methodology is related to the choice 
of the discount rate. The valuation formula 
from Equation 3 gives the expected value of 
w at exercise time, T. Thus, to fi nd its value 
today, it is necessary to discount the distribu-
tions of revenues and costs to the present with 
a risk-adjusted discount rate. This risk-adjusted 
discount rate could be the cost of capital used 
by the investor for similar projects or it can be 
found with traditional methodologies such as the 
capital asset pricing model (CAPM).
EXAMPLE: AN AIRPORT EXPANSION 
PROJECT
The valuation methodology developed here is 
very flexible and can be applied to many different 
situations. In particular, this methodology is 
suitable to evaluate projects where capital 
investments are large, implementation times are 
long, and uncertainties are large. Investments in 
air transportation, such as the construction of 
new runways, new passenger buildings, or 
new aircraft programs, share these qualities. 
Therefore, the example of the city with an 
interest in building a new airport with one or 
two runways mentioned previously is used to 
illustrate the methodology proposed in this 
paper. 
The real option considered here consists 
of the right, but not the obligation, of building 
a second runway to obtain the revenues from 
the demand served by the added capacity. The 
underlying asset, S, is expected revenues from 
travel demand served by the second runway. The 
exercise price, X, is the sum of the construction 
and maintenance costs of the second runway. 
The value of the option is the maximum price of 
the land for the second runway that the project 
developer would be willing to pay. 
This is a real option to expand because by 
purchasing the land, the option owner acquires 
the possibility of expanding current infrastruc-
ture by building a second runway at a specifi c 
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point in time if demand requires it. Notice that 
this is not a real option to delay. A real option 
to delay would assume that the second runway 
is always built, but at a later date than originally 
planned. This stands in contrast to the real op-
tion to expand where the second runway may 
never be built. 
The purpose of the evaluation methodology 
is to determine whether the value of the real 
option (building a second runway) is greater 
than the cost of the real option (buying the land). 
If it is, then the city should follow this strategy 
and purchase the land for the second runway. 
Several different scenarios are considered to 
analyze the effect of different maturity times, 
size of the investment, and time to deliver the 
investment on project fi nancial performance and 
on the value of the real option.
Modeling the Airport Expansion Project 
with System Dynamics
System dynamics is used to model the airport 
expansion project (see Figure 6). In this 
particular example developed by Miller and 
Clarke (Miller and Clarke, 2003), runway 
capacity is the limiting factor that leads to 
congestion. As demand for air travel (aircraft 
per hour) increases, the total number of aircraft 
requesting service on this runway (total aircraft) 
also increases. Demand is modeled as a mean-
reverting stochastic process according to the 
process outlined (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). If 
runway capacity is held constant, the increase 
in demand slowly leads to congestion, which 
raises the direct operating costs of airlines 
(airline congestion cost). The higher operating 
costs are passed on to the passenger in terms of 
higher air fares (air fare impact) and this leads 
to less demand for travel (congestion cost loop). 
In addition, congestion decreases the level of 
service by lengthening passenger travel time 
(level of service impact) which also results in 
less demand for aviation services (passenger 
comfort loop). When the decision to add capacity 
is taken, i.e., when the option is exercised, a 
certain amount of capacity (capacity increase) 
is delivered after a certain period of time (years 
to increase capacity). The decision to expand 
capacity is the key managerial intervention in 
this model. Once capacity is added to the runway, 
congestion decreases, thus, stimulating demand 
by reducing the air fare impact and level of 
service impact. Delivery costs represent the 
expenditure associated with providing the 
desired capacity expansion. Maintenance costs
are recurring costs associated with maintaining 
the added capacity. The model assumes that 
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congestion occurs only at a given number of 
peak hours per year.
There are two main outputs from this model. 
The fi rst are the benefi ts from the expanded in-
frastructure accrued to the airport operator in 
terms of airport revenues. Here, it is assumed 
that they consist mainly of landing fees paid by 
the airlines and passenger facility charges (PFC) 
paid by each traveler. The second output are the 
costs of infrastructure expansion (delivery cost) 
and maintenance (maintenance costs) of this ex-
panded infrastructure. These outputs are used to 
calculate the value of the underlying asset, S, and 
the exercise price, X. 
The numbers used to calibrate the model are 
meant to illustrate a realistic situation but they 
do not represent an actual airport. The airport in 
this study is assumed to be a one-runway facility 
that serves primarily narrow-body aircraft. The 
current runway capacity was set at 40 aircraft 
per hour. Landing fees were estimated at $200 
per aircraft based on data given by de Neufville 
and Odoni (2003) and the typical weight of 
narrow-body aircraft. It is further assumed that 
congestion occurs only at peak hours and there 
are 1,000 peak hours in a year. The simulation 
time period is in years and each run covers 30 
years. Demand was calibrated using historical 
data for air travel demand in the United States 
between 1979 and 2001 contained in the Form 
41 database (USDOT, 1979-2001).
Monte Carlo simulation is used in combi-
nation with the system dynamics model to take 
into account multiple sources of uncertainty. The 
variables in Table 1 were assumed to behave 
randomly.
A total of 1,000 runs are made in each 
Monte Carlo simulation.
Infrastructure Delivery Strategies
Different capacity expansion strategies were 
analyzed to determine the variation in the value 
of flexibility. Three parameters were assumed to 
defi ne an infrastructure delivery strategy: 1) the 
maturity of the option, 2) the size of the capacity 
expansion, and 3) the time to deliver the capacity 
once the decision to expand has been made. For 
the maturity time, three values were considered: 
2, 5, and 10 years. These are the values on the 
horizontal axis of Figures 7 to 12. The size of 
the expansion was considered to be small (25% 
of existing capacity), medium (50% of existing 
capacity) and large (75% of existing capacity). 
Three times to deliver capacity were assumed: 
5, 7, and 10 years. The life of all projects was 
assumed to be 30 years.
The Value of Flexibility 
Here, it is assumed that the value of flexibility is 
the difference between the value of the flexible 
strategy and the maximum of the value of the 
inflexible strategies or zero:
(4) Value of flexibility = Value of flexible   
strategy – max[Value of inflex. strategy, 
0]
The value of the flexible strategy is calcu-
lated with Equation 3. The value of the inflex-
ible project is calculated as the mean of the net 
present values for each run in the Monte Carlo 
simulation. If the mean NPV of the inflexible 
strategy is negative, the project would not be 
undertaken. Thus in this case, the appropriate 
comparison to fi nd the value of flexibility should 
be between the value of the flexible strategy as 
calculated with Equation 3 and zero.
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Strategies with Small (25%) Capacity 
Increase
Projects that consider a 25% increase in capacity 
have, in general, a positive expected NPV 
(Figure 7). The intuition is that small increases 
in capacity are suffi cient to meet the expected 
demand. Therefore, there is no need to incur 
large capital expenditures and the costs can 
be recovered more rapidly. Another important 
consideration is the timing of the investment: 
as the capital delivery is pushed further into the 
future (in other words, as maturity and/or time to 
deliver capacity increase), the expected value of 
the project decreases. Delaying the infrastructure 
expansion results in the airport not being able to 
capitalize on the demand that would materialize 
if the additional capacity was available. For 
example, the only case where the project has 
a negative expected NPV is when the maturity 
is 10 years and it takes 10 years to deliver the 
capacity. In this situation, capacity is added so 
late in the life of the project that there are only a 
handful of periods available to generate revenues 
and recover the investment.
The value of flexibility for these projects is 
minimal (Figure 8). Because they are very likely 
to succeed by following an inflexible strategy, 
having a flexible approach does not improve their 
expected value.
Strategies with Medium (50%) Capacity 
Increase
Projects that consider a medium capacity 
increase are not clear winners. Depending on 
the maturity of the real option and the time 
to deliver capacity, the expected NPV of the 
inflexible strategies may be negative, close to 
zero, or positive (Figure 9). This indicates that 
the timing of the infrastructure delivery must be 
considered carefully. In general, early exercise 
results in too much capacity relative to demand, 
thus it is diffi cult to recover the investment. 
As the exercise date recedes into the future, 
demand can grow to levels where the large added 
infrastructure can be better utilized. Notice, 
however, that a short time to deliver capacity 
is always preferable. A long time to deliver 
capacity may result in the project not being able 
to generate enough revenues to recover costs or 
to miss the market completely.
The value of flexibility for these cases is 
higher than for those projects with 25% capacity 
increase (Figure 10). In addition, notice that the 
value of flexibility is highest for those situations 
where the expected value of the inflexible project 
is close to zero. Intuitively, flexibility is most 
valuable in these circumstances as it can tip the 
project towards positive outcomes.
Strategies with Large (75%) Capacity 
Increase
Strategies with large capacity increase result 
in projects with negative expected net present 
values in almost all situations (Figure 11). In 
general terms, these strategies lead to excess 
capacity (over-investment) with a large 
expenditure that can not be recovered with the 
expected traffi c.
The value of flexibility for projects with 
large negative expected net present value is zero 
(Figure 12). Because the performance of these 
inflexible projects is so poor, flexibility alone is 
not enough to push them into the positive realm. 
Notice, however, that the value of flexibility is 
higher for those projects with an expected NPV 
close to zero. 
APPLICATION TO A REAL-WORLD 
SITUATION
The airport example considered here is 
hypothetical, but it is grounded in the real 
world. The values used for the system dynamics 
model and the Monte Carlo simulation are based 
on typical values observed in practice. The 
application of the methodology to an actual 
airport expansion project should therefore be 
relatively straightforward provided that enough 
data is available. 
There are two major sets of data required 
to implement this methodology to a real-world 
airport situation. First, a delay model for the 
airport is required. This model must be able 
to quantify flight delays given current runway 
capacity and current demand. In addition, the 
delay model must anticipate delays under 
different capacity expansion scenarios and 
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Figure 7: Expected Value of Projects without Flexibility for 
  Strategies that Consider 25% Capacity Increase 
  and 5, 7, and 10 Years to Increase Capacity
Figure 8: Value of Flexibility for Strategies that Consider 25% 
  Capacity Increase and 5, 7, and 10 Years to Increase 
  Capacity
Figure 9: Expected Value of Projects without Flexibility for 
  Strategies that Consider 50% Capacity Increase and 
  5, 7, and 10 Years to Increase Capacity
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Figure 10: Value of Flexibility for Strategies that Consider 50%
    Capacity Increase and 5, 7, and 10 Years to Increase Capacity
Figure 11: Expected Value of Projects without Flexibility for Strategies 
    that Consider 75% Capacity Increase and 5, 7, and 10 Years to 












Figure 12: Value of Flexibility for Strategies that Consider 75% 
    Capacity Increase and 5, 7, and 10 Years to Increase 
    Capacity
Air Transportation
72
the evolution of future airport demand. The 
second set of data is runway construction and 
maintenance costs, passenger facility charges, 
landing fees, and airline operating costs. 
Estimates of passenger-demand elasticity to 
price and to travel time would also be required. 
Furthermore, any particular situations unique to 
the airport, such as environmental concerns and/
or community impact, should also be factored 
into the system dynamics model and Monte 
Carlo simulation. 
Most of the data mentioned above should 
be available from airport authorities and traf-
fi c records maintained by the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA). The primary purpose of 
this paper is to illustrate the methodology with 
a generic example. A case study applied to a 
specifi c airport would be a logical extension to 
the work presented here.
CONCLUSIONS
New Methodology to Determine the Value 
of Real Options
The methodology developed here can be used 
to evaluate European call-like real options 
with uncertain stock and strike prices. If 
the distribution of costs and revenues can 
be expressed analytically, the methodology 
provides a closed-form solution for the value of 
the real option. A benefi t over similar analytical 
approaches, such as the ones proposed by 
Fischer (1978) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994), 
is that the stock and strike price are not restricted 
to behaving like geometric Brownian motions. 
With respect to the Tufano-Moel approach, the 
methodology developed here would have the 
advantage of not being restricted to simulating 
the behavior of the stock and strike prices.
Another potential advantage of the 
methodology developed here is the possibility 
of managing cost for a given demand. For 
example, if demand is well understood, the 
formula developed here could be used to fi nd 
the cost profi le that would maximize the value 
of the project. 
The valuation methodology developed 
here is very flexible and can be applied to 
many different situations. In particular, 
this methodology is suitable to evaluate 
projects where capital investments are large, 
implementation times are long, and uncertainties 
are large. Investments in air transportation share 
these qualities. 
Strategies with Small Capacity Increases 
Have Better Chances of Success
In general, strategies with small (25%) capacity 
increase are likely to have a higher expected 
NPV, all else equal. The intuition is that small 
increases in capacity are suffi cient to meet the 
expected demand in the system modeled here. 
Therefore, there is no need to incur large capital 
expenditures and the costs can be recovered more 
rapidly. 
If Capacity Increases are Large, a Long 
Maturity Date is Better
If capacity increases are medium (50%) or large 
(75%), the project developer is better off with 
a longer exercise date. In general, options with 
short maturities results in too much capacity 
relative to demand, thus it is diffi cult to recover 
the investment. As the exercise date recedes into 
the future, demand can grow to levels where the 
infrastructure can be better utilized. 
Short Times to Increase Capacity are Best
Regardless of the capacity increase or the 
exercise date, a short time to increase capacity 
results in a higher expected value. Once the 
decision to increase the capacity has been made 
(and the resources committed), the sooner the 
capacity is in place, the sooner its costs can be 
recovered.
Flexibility is Most Valuable in Uncertain 
Situations
The value of flexibility depends on the 
performance of the inflexible project. For 
projects with large positive or large negative net 
present values, flexibility is not very valuable 
because there is little action that a manager can 
take to improve the present value of the project; 
however, if the NPV of the inflexible project is 
close to zero, flexibility can be very valuable. 
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Implications for the Air Transportation 
Industry
The results indicate that small infrastructure 
increases are the best alternative to ensure 
profitability. However, small capacity 
expansions may not always be feasible in air 
transportation infrastructure projects, such as 
airports. Generally, capital expenditures imply 
the construction of a whole new runway which 
adds a considerable amount of capacity to 
the facility. It is in these cases that flexibility 
becomes very valuable because the size of the 
expansion implies spending a considerable 
amount of resources that may not be recovered 
if demand does not materialize. Thus, having the 
option to abandon the project if conditions are 
not favorable can be very valuable.
In addition, a short response time in the 
capacity delivery is very important. By being able 
to react quickly to the market, project managers 
can capture and maybe even stimulate demand 
that otherwise could be lost if the response time 
was slow. Building flexibility into their projects 
gives management this ability.
Endnotes
1.  This discussion is based on Brealey and Myers (1996).
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